We present strong attacks against quantum key distribution schemes which use quantum memories and quantum gates to attack directly the final key. We analyze a specific attack of this type, for which we find the density matrices available to the eavesdropper and the optimal information which can be extracted from them. We prove security against this attack and discuss security against any attack allowed by the rules of quantum mechanics. [S0031-9007(97) Quantum cryptography [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] uses quantum mechanics to perform new cryptographic tasks-especially information secure key distributions-which are beyond the abilities of classical cryptography. Unfortunately, the security of such a key is still unproven: Sophisticated attacks (called coherent or joint attacks) which are directed against the final key were suggested; the analysis of such attacks is very complicated, and, by the time this work was submitted, security against them was proven only in the nonrealistic case of ideal (error-free) channels [6, 7] . The security in the real case, which is crucial for making quantum cryptography practical, is commonly believed but yet unproven. A proof of security must bound the information available to the eavesdropper (traditionally called "Eve"), on the final key, to be negligible (i.e., much smaller than one bit). A protocol is considered secure if the adversary is restricted only by the rules of quantum mechanics, and a protocol is considered practical if the legitimate users are restricted to use existing technology. In this work we obtain the strongest security result for practical protocols. We suggest collective attacks (simpler than the joint attacks) which are simple enough to be analyzed, but are general enough to imply (or at least suggest) the security against any attack. We prove security against the simplest collective attack: We generalize methods developed in [8] in order to calculated Eve's density matrices explicitly, and to find the information which can be obtained from them; we show that it is negligible. Our result also provides better understanding of the issue of information splitting between two parties which is a fundamental problem in quantum information theory. Parts of this work were done together with Dominic Mayers.
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In any quantum key distribution scheme, the sender, "Alice," sends to the receiver, "Bob," a classical string of bits by encoding them as quantum states. In the two-state scheme [2] (B92 scheme) a classical bit is represented by either of two nonorthogonal pure states, which can be written as c 0 °c os u sin u
¢
, and c 1 °c os u 2 sin u ¢ . Bob performs a test which provides him with a conclusive or inconclusive result. For instance, he can test whether a specific particle is in a state c 0 or a state orthogonal to it c 0 0 ; a result c 0 is treated as inconclusive, and a result c 0 0 is identified as c 1 . Alice and Bob use also an unjammable classical channel to inform which bits were identified conclusively, and to compare some of the common bits in order to estimate the error rate. They must accept some small error rate p e due to imperfections in creating, transmitting, and receiving the quantum states. If the estimated error rate exceeds the allowed error rate they quit the transmission and do not use the data, thus any eavesdropping attempt is severely constrained to induce an error rate smaller than p e . Alice and Bob are now left with similar n-bit strings which contain errors. They randomize the order of the bits and correct the errors using any error-correction code [9] . The error-correction code is usually made of r parities of substrings [where the parity bit p͑x͒ of a binary string x is zero if there is an even number of 1's in x, and one otherwise]. Alice sends these parties to Bob (using the classical channel), who uses them to obtain a (possibly shorter) string identical to Alice's, up to an exponentially small error probability. Finally, Alice and Bob can amplify the security of the final key by using privacy amplification techniques [10] by choosing some parity bits of substrings to be the final key. Their aim is to derive a final key on which Eve's average information is negligible.
Eve can measure some of the particles and gain a lot of information on them, but this induces a lot of error. Hence, she can attack only a small portion of the particles, and this reduces her information on the parity of many bits exponentially to zero. Translucent attacks [11] are much more powerful: Eve attaches a probe to each particle and performs some unitary transformation, after which her probe is correlated to the transmitted state. In the case where each probe is left in a pure state [11] , and measured separately to obtain information on Alice's bit, it is a rather obvious conclusion (from [10] ) that privacy amplification is still effective. Thus, such an individual translucent attack is ineffective. We deal with a much more sophisticated attack in which Eve's measurement is done after the processes of error correction and privacy amplification are completed. Privacy amplification techniques were not designed to stand against such attacks, hence their efficiency against them is yet unknown. Consider the following collective attack: (1) Eve attaches a separate, uncorrelated probe to each transmitted particle using a translucent attack. (2) Eve keeps the probes in a quantum memory (where nonorthogonal quantum states can be kept for a long time [5] ) till receiving all classical data including error-correction and privacy amplification data. (3) Eve performs the optimal measurement on her probes in order to learn the maximal information on the final key. The case in which Eve attaches one probe (in a largedimensional Hilbert space) to all transmitted particles is called a joint or coherent attack [4] , and it is the most general possible attack. No specific joint attacks were yet suggested; the collective attack defined above is the strongest joint attack suggested so far, and there are good reasons to believe that it is the strongest possible attack.
The security of quantum cryptography is a very complicated and tricky problem. Several security claims done in the past were found later on to contain loopholes. Recently, we become aware of three new such claims [12 -14] . We hope that these approaches, together with our approach, really produce the solution; yet it is important to have them all, since each of them has different advantages.
Our approach deals with error correction and privacy amplification, by calculating the density matrices which are available to the eavesdropper by the time all data transmissions (classical and quantum) are completed. We provide an example of collective attacks based on the "translucent attack without entanglement" of [11] , which leave Eve with probes in a pure state, and we prove security against them. These attacks use the unitary transformation ͑ cos u 6 sin u ͒ ! ͑ cos u 0 6 sin u 0 ͒ ͑ cos a 6 sin a ͒ with "1" for c 0 , and "2" for c 1 , where u 0 is the angle of the states received by Bob, and a is the angle of the states in Eve's hand. The error rate, p e sin 2 ͑u 2 u 0 ͒, is the probability that Alice sent c 0 and Bob measured c 0 0 . The connection between this induced error rate and the angle a is calculated using the unitary condition [11] cos 2u cos 2u 0 cos 2a. For weak attacks which causes small error rate the angle of Eve's probe satisfies a ͑p e tan 2 2u͒ 1͞4 . In our case, the same translucent attack is performed on all the bits, and it leaves Eve with n probes, each in one of the two states ͑ c 6s ͒, with c cos a and s sin a. As result, Eve holds an n bits string x which is concatenated from its bits ͑x͒ 1 ͑x͒ 2 · · · ͑x͒ n . For simplicity, we choose the final key to consist of one bit, which is the parity of the n bits. Eve wants to distinguish between two density matrices corresponding to the two possible values of this parity bit. Our aim is to calculate the optimal mutual information she can extract from them.
For our analysis we need some more notations. Let n͑x͒ be the number of 1's in x. For two strings of equal length x Ø y is the bitwise "AND," so that p͑xØj͒ . The density matrix r x c x c T x also has for any x, the same terms up to the signs. We denote the absolute values by r jk ϵ j͑ r x ͒ jk j. The sign of each term ͑r x ͒ jk is given by
A priori, all strings are equally probable, and Eve needs to distinguish between the two density matrices describing the parities. These matrices were calculated and analyzed in Bennett, Mor, and Smolin [8] (henceforth, the BMS work), and independently in [15] for the case a p͞4. In case Eve is being told what the error-correction code is, all strings consistent with the given error-correction code (the r subparities) are equally probable, and Eve needs to distinguish between the two density matrices,
where "OECC" is a shortcut for "obeys error-correction code." Let us look at two simple examples where n 5, one with r 1 and the second with r 2. Suppose that the parity of the first two bits, ͑x͒ 1 and ͑x͒ 2 , is p 1 0. Formally, this substring is described by the n-bit string y 1 24 which is 11000 binary; the number of 1's in the first two bits of a string x is given byn͑x Ø y 1 ͒, and x obeys the error-correction code if p͑x Ø y 1 ͒ p 1 . Let y d be the binary string (11111 in this case) which describes the substring of the desired parity. Eve could perform the optimal attack on the three bit which are left or, in general, on y 1 © y d . For any such case, the optimal attack is given by the BMS work, and the optimal information depends onn͑y 1 © y d ͒, the Hamming distance between the two words. This information [using Eq. (53) of the BMS work]
is I͑n͒ c
with c 1 for evenn (which equals 2k) and c 1͞ ln 2 for oddn (that isn 2k 2 1). Suppose that Eve gets another parity bit p 2 1 of the binary string 01100 ͑y 2 12͒. Now, a string x obeys the error-correction code if it also obeys p͑x Ø y 2 ͒ p 2 . Clearly, it also satisfies p͓x Ø ͑y 1 © y 2 ͔͒ p 1 © p 2 . In the general case there are r independent parity strings, and 2 r parity strings in the set ͕y͖ r (including the string 00000). The BMS result cannot be directly used but still provides some intuition: For each word (i.e., each parity string) y l [ ͕y͖ r , let I͓n͑y l © y d ͔͒ be the optimal information Eve could obtain using Eq. (4). Also let I sum be the sum of these contributions from all such words. In reality Eve cannot obtain I sum since each measurement changes the state of the measured bits, hence we expect that I sum bounds her optimal information I total from above: I total , I sum . On the other hand, Eve knows all these words at once, and could take advantage of it, thus we leave this as an unproven conjecture.
In the following we find an explicit way to calculate exactly the optimal information. However, this exact result requires cumbersome calculations, thus it is used only to verify the conjecture for short strings.
The parity of the full string is also known since the density matrix r ͑n,r11͒ corresponds to either r ͑n,r͒ 0 or r ͑n,r͒ 1 depending on the desired parity p r11 , thus we add the string y r11 y d . There are r 1 1 independent subparities altogether, hence 2 r11 parity strings in the set ͕y͖ r11 . A string x is included in r ͑n,r11͒ if p͓x Ø y l ͔ p l for all given substring in ͕y͖ r11 . In the BMS work (where r 0) the parity density matrices were put in a block diagonal form of 2 n21 blocks of size 2 3 2. This result can be generalized to the case where r parities of substrings are given. There will be 2 n2r21 blocks of size 2 r11 3 2 r11 . We shall show that the ͑jk͒th term in a density matrix r ͑n,r11͒ of r 1 1 subparities is either zero, r jk or 2r jk , that is, either all the relevant strings contribute exactly the same term, or half of them cancels the other half. The proof can be skipped in a first reading.
Theorem.-The element ͑r ͑n,r11͒ ͒ jk is zero if j © k " ͕y͖ r11 , and it is 6r jk if j © k [ ͕y͖ r11 .
Proof.-In case j © k " ͕y͖ r11 choose C such that p͓C Ø y l ͔ 0 with all ͑y l ͒'s in ͕y͖ r11 and p͓C Ø ͑j © k͔͒ 1 (many such C's exist since C has n independent bits and it needs to fulfill only r 1 2 constraints). For such a C and for any x which obeys the error-correction code there exists one (and only one) y, y x © C, which also obeys the code (due to the first demand) but has the opposite sign in the jkth element (due to the second demand), so ͑r y ͒ jk 2͑r x ͒ jk . Since this is true for any relevant x, we obtain ͑r ͑n,r11͒ ͒ jk 0. In case j © k [ ͕y͖ r11 such C cannot exist, and all terms must have the same sign: Suppose that there are two terms, x and y with opposite signs. Then C x © y satisfies the two demands, leading to a contradiction.
This theorem tells us the place of all nonvanishing terms in the original ordering. The matrices can be reordered to a block-diagonal form by exchanges of the basis vectors. We group the vectors s, s © y 1 , etc., for all ͑y l ͒'s in ͕y͖ r11 to be one after the other, so each such group is separated from the other groups. Now the theorem implies that all nonvanishing terms are grouped in blocks, and all vanishing terms are outside these blocks. As a result the matrix is block diagonal. This forms 2 n2r21 blocks of size 2 r11 3 2 r11 . All terms inside the blocks and their signs are given by Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively, up to reordering. The organization of the blocks depends only on the parity strings y l and not on the parities p l , thus r ͑n,r͒ 0 and r ͑n,r͒ 1 are block diagonalized in the same basis. The rank of a density matrix is the number of (independent) pure states which form it, and it is 2 n2r21 in case of the parity matrices [Eq. (3)]. When these matrices are put in a block-diagonal form, there are 2 n2r21 (all nonzero) blocks. Thus, the rank of each block is one, the corresponding state is pure, and, when fully diagonalized, the nonvanishing term a j in the jth block is the probability that a measurement will result in this block.
In the BMS work ͑r 0͒, the information , in case of small angle, was found to be exponentially small with the length of the string. When each probe is in a pure state, this result can be generalized to r . 0 as follows: The optimal mutual information carried by two pure states (in any dimension) in well known. The two possible pure states in the jth block of r ͑n,r͒ 0 and r ͑n,r͒ 1 can be written as ͑ cos b 6 sin b ͒. The optimal mutual information which can be obtained from the jth block is given by the overlap (the angle b j ) I j 1 1 p j log 2 p j 1 ͑1 2 p j ͒ log 2 ͑1 2 p j ͒, where p j ͑1 2 sin 2B j ͒͞2; the overlap is calculated using Eqs. (1) and (2) . Thus, for any given errorcorrection code, we can find the two pure states in each block, the optimal information I j , and finally, the total information I total S j a j I j . We did not use the value of y d in the proof, and thus, the final key could be the parity of any substring. Moreover, a similar method can be used to analyze keys of several bits which can be formed from parities of several substrings.
We wrote a computer program which receives any (short) error-correction code and calculates the total information as a function of the angle a between the pure states of the individual probes. We checked many short codes (up to n 8) to verify whether I total , I sum as we conjectured. Indeed, all our checks showed that the conjecture holds. The information for small angle a is bounded by I sum Ca 2k as previously explained, where C is given by summing the terms which contribute to the highest order of Eq. (4), and the Hamming distancê n (which is 2k or 2k 2 1) can be increased by choosing longer codes to provide any desired level of security.
